Starlink turbocharges lethal jihadist group in Africa

(Photo by John Keeble/Getty Images)

In the Sahel region of West Africa, an ascendant jihadist group is using Starlink, SpaceX's high-speed satellite internet service, to increase its operational capabilities, recruiting, and fundraising.

The technology has helped Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, or JNIM, a Salafi jihadist group and al-Qaeda affiliate operating out of Burkina Faso, Mali, and other nearby countries, overpower and outmaneuver local government forces, according to Dr. Obasesam Okoi, a University of St. Thomas professor who researches technology and conflict in Africa. Before Starlink, Okoi said, JNIM often had to rely "on couriers, on paper maps, or sporadic access to cyber miles away from their bases, and this made them slow to respond to shifting battlefield dynamics."

"But now, with technologies like Starlink, they can log onto a stable, high-speed satellite connection from anywhere, even live in the desert or forest," he continued. "They are using real-time maps, encrypted messaging platforms, and even live streams to plan and secure attacks with incredible coordination. This has radically shifted the balance of power between insurgent groups and state actors."

SpaceX did not respond to a request for comment.

JNIM's adoption of Starlink has coincided with its growing strength and lethality. On May 11, the group carried out a coordinated attack on Djibo, a provincial capital in northern Burkina Faso, that involved hundreds of militants. Equipped with light improvised fighting vehicles and motorcycles, the JNIM fighters overwhelmed local forces, killing more than a hundred civilians, soldiers, and militia members, according to the International Crisis Group. A secondary propaganda victory ensued: JNIM quickly shared videos on social media of its fighters looting the city's army base and law enforcement offices.

"To a great extent, communication technologies like Starlink have enabled… access to platforms like Telegram, WhatsApp, and even TikTok," said Okoi, who noted that JNIM's digital messaging is used for fundraising and is directed both at local communities and diasporic audiences in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and North America. "What we are seeing is a sophisticated digital propaganda machine using video narratives, montages, and appeals for donations, being managed in real time from conflict zones by these insurgent groups." Along with its social media operations, JNIM disseminates its own polished TV-style news broadcasts and audio dispatches.

The Djibo attack came less than two months after JNIM killed more than 60 Burkinabe soldiers and volunteers while attacking Diapaga, another provincial capital, in an operation that involved the use of reconnaissance drones. Since May, JNIM has carried out at least 10 large-scale attacks in the region, resulting in hundreds of deaths, according to Critical Threats.

While SpaceX has not received regulatory approval to operate Starlink in Burkina Faso, many of the other countries in which JNIM operates or is adjacent to have approved the service, including Niger, Chad, and Benin. The military junta controlling Mali, where JNIM originated from, banned Starlink for seven months last year, citing the use of the service by jihadist groups. The ban was lifted in October.

Regulators have been unable to contain the lucrative black market that has arisen to meet the demand for Starlink in the region. Starlink terminals, the hardware required to connect to the network, are frequently smuggled across the porous borders that divide the Sahel. The Azawad Liberation Front, a nationalist group seeking the creation of an independent state in Northern Mali, "is very prolific when it comes to the use of Starlink," said Héni Nsaibia, a senior West Africa analyst at the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data nonprofit. "They have also been a distributor of these because they have a presence in Mauritania. And it's usually from Mauritania and Algeria where a lot of these logistical supplies come in from."

Terminals are also purchased legally in the Nigerian market, where Starlink is the second-largest internet service provider, before being smuggled into Niger, according to a report released last month by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

"Traffickers charge FCFA260 000–FCFA400 000 (€396–€609) to smuggle each kit," the report found. "The fee includes bribes to law enforcement officials, which typically amount to FCFA20 000–FCFA30 000 (€30–€45). The trafficking networks also profit from subscription fees, charging end-users FCFA50 000–FCFA75 000 (€75–€120) a month, more than twice the actual cost in Niger."

Diverse revenue streams — cattle rustling, extortion, collection of zakat taxes, artisanal mining, among others — have allowed JNIM to build a substantial war chest. Arms and ammunition trafficking provide another ample and often overlooked source of income, explained Nsaibia. "In Djibo, in 2023, they overran a regiment-sized base posting more than 400 soldiers, and they took the whole stockpile," he said. "We estimated that the spoils were worth $2 million in local black market value."

While Nsaibia does not believe that Starlink has profoundly changed the dynamics of conflict in the Sahel, he did note that JNIM informants he has spoken with have attributed the group’s improved communication and intelligence capabilities to the technology.

One informant even claimed JNIM uses Starlink to detect potential aerial threats. "He acknowledged that he doesn't know how they do it," said Nsaibia of the informant. "He said, 'Yeah, I've been told that they are using these devices somehow to detect aircraft or drones.' But I believe they use Starlink in combination with some other systems, like radio frequencies, signal radar… and combine them with mobile spotters to set up a detection system."

JNIM's use of Starlink is just the latest instance of insurgent groups and other criminal actors adopting the technology. Last year, in Northeast Nigeria, government forces recovered a Starlink kit from members of Boko Haram, a jihadist group operating in the Sahel. "That was the first time that everybody became aware that Boko Haram was using Starlink," said Dr. Ebenezer Obadare, a senior fellow for Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. "But even before then, it was clear that they had access to a very sophisticated satellite network. I had my hunch it was Starlink just because of their efficacy, speed, and production."

And in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary force at war with the Sudanese Armed Forces, uploaded a propaganda video last year featuring a Starlink terminal. On the other side of the world, in war-torn Myanmar, criminal groups have used Starlink to run massive internet scam compounds that utilize enslaved workforces.

In West Africa, Obadare said that Starlink has helped jihadist groups stay one step ahead of government forces, who are often overstretched and logistically outmatched by their non-state adversaries. "Starlink is supposed to help you in the remotest of villages, right? And if you're a terrorist and you rely on mobile logistics, you attack government structures, and then you retreat back into the forest," said Obadare. "If you are a terrorist group that wants to attack and retreat at speed, then you couldn't find a better satellite network."

To limit the misuse of satellite networks in conflict zones, Okoi, the University of St. Thomas professor, said that SpaceX and other providers must work with regional governments to develop a regulatory framework that would more thoroughly screen users, restrict where the technology can be accessed, and require a portion of corporate profits be invested into local communities. That would also mean prioritizing ethical considerations over market expansion. "The problem here is not just technological. It's about political neglect, it's about regulatory delay," said Okoi. "So we see militants exploiting this vacuum, while civilians pay the price."